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ABSTRACT
Once a firm decides to issue debt, the characteristics of this debt instrument should be considered.
One of the critical decisions involves debt maturity. Using a sample of 1091 Belgian small firms from
1996 until 2000, this study analyses the determinants of the corporate debt-maturity structure of small
firms in a creditor-oriented system. Consistent with previous empirical evidence on large firms, the
present results strongly support the maturity-matching principle. The hypothesis that firms with many
growth opportunities will borrow on the short term as a response to the under-investment problem, is
not supported. There is a clear relation between the credit worthiness of a firm and the debt-maturity
structure. Firms with a better credit score borrow on the long term, whereas firms with a poor credit
quality are apparently forced to borrow on the short term. This evidence contradicts the expected U-
shaped relationship between credit worthiness and debt maturity. Size negatively influences debt
maturity.
Keywords: debt maturity, capital structure, small firms
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4INTRODUCTION
As Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated implicitly, and as Stiglitz (1974) demonstrated
explicitly, both the capital structure of a firm and debt maturity are irrelevant in perfect capital
markets. In other words, decisions concerning the maturity of a debt contracted by a firm can never
augment the value of a firm. To prove this, Stiglitz (1974), as well as Modigliani and Miller (1958),
made a number of assumptions. These included: (i) the absence of taxes; (ii) that default is not
possible; and (iii) that personal lending is equivalent to corporate lending. Several theoretical papers
have discussed the influence of so-called imperfections on the corporate debt-maturity structure.
Myers (1977) demonstrated the importance of growth opportunities. Other important theoretical
contributions have been those of Brick and Ravid (1985, 1991), Diamond (1991, 1993), and
Flannery (1986). Empirical evidence has been provided by Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay and
Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Ozkan (2000),
and Scherr and Hulburt (2001)
In the present paper, the determinants of the corporate debt-maturity structure of small firms
in a creditor-oriented system are investigated. The present analysis adds to the existing literature in
two important ways.
This is a study of small firms. Most studies of debt-maturity structure have used a sample of
large, and often quoted firms. The only previous study to have employed data on small firms appears
to have been that of Scherr and Hulburt (2001). Because small firms differ from large firms in several
characteristics (for example, ownership structure, flexibility, taxes), their financing options and
methods are also quite different. For these reasons, a specific study of the maturity structure of small
firms is appropriate.
The present study uses data from a country with a creditor-oriented system. The only other
study also focusing on a creditor-oriented system was that of Cai, Cheun and Goyal (1999) who
investigated the determinants of the maturity of public debt issues in Japan. Because they examined
public debt issues, their sample also included larger firms. Other authors have focused on listed firms
in a market-oriented system (see Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and
Mauer (1996), and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for studies in the United States, and Ozkan (2000) for
studies in the United Kingdom). This is a significant issue for consideration because it is often argued
5that banks are better monitors of debt, and can mitigate agency problems. Taken together, these
factors influence debt maturity.
The main findings of the present analysis, based on a sample of 4,506 firm-year observations
for 1,091 small Belgian firms for the period from 1996 to 2000, are that: the maturity-matching
principle is the most important determinant of the debt-maturity structure; growth options do not seem
to influence debt maturity; the better the credit worthiness of a firm, the longer the borrowing period
they utilise; and larger firms borrow on a shorter term than smaller firms.
The maturity-matching principle has been strongly supported in other empirical work, whereas
evidence on the influence of growth opportunities has been mixed. The relationship presented here
between credit worthiness and debt maturity is unique in the empirical literature. The empirical
evidence on the influence of size has been mixed, with both positive and negative relationships having
been reported.
The remainder of the present paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, a concise literature
review is provided, and hypotheses are proposed. Section 3 provides information on the sample.
Section 4 discusses the variables, and Section 5 discusses the estimation model used in the empirical
analysis. In Section 6, the empirical results are presented. Section 7 provides a summarising
conclusion to the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The choice of debt maturity
Morris (1976) has argued that firms try to match the maturity of assets and liabilities because
this reduces the risk that incoming cash flows might be insufficient to cover interest payments and
capital outlays. Debt with a maturity shorter than the maturity of assets is risky because the assets
might not have yielded enough profit to repay the debt. Debt with a maturity longer than the maturity
of the assets is also risky because debt might have to be repaid after the assets have ceased to yield
income. Consequently, firms try to match the maturities of assets and debt. This is known as ‘maturity
matching’. This leads to the following hypothesis being proposed:
Hypothesis 1: Firms try to match the maturity of assets with that of liabilities.
6According to Myers (1977), reducing debt maturity is an attempt to solve the problem of
under investment. He argued that, under debt financing, it is possible that managers might not carry
out investments with a positive net present value. When leverage is high, residual claims will be very
low and profits from investments will benefit only creditors. Because shareholders will not earn a  fair
return, they will be reluctant to pursue future investments, which reduces the investment opportunity
set and, because firm value equals the value of assets in place and the value of the investment
opportunity set, ultimately also reduces firm value. The under-investment problem is of course more
severe when a firm has more growth opportunities. Myers (1977) has suggested some solutions to
this under-investment problem. One solution consists of reducing the maturity of debt. Issuing debt
that matures before an investment opportunity can be carried out will not lead to under investment.
Long-term debt is thus best achieved by rolling over short-term debt. This leads to the following
hypothesis being proposed:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with high growth opportunities borrow on the short term.
Other solutions to the under-investment problem are: (i) reducing the amount of debt in the
capital structure; or (ii) including restrictive covenants in the debt agreement. Diamond (1991) focused
on the relationship between debt maturity and the credit worthiness of a firm. A key concept in his
theory is liquidity risk. Diamond defined liquidity risk as the risk that a debtor will lose control rents
because creditors do not want to refinance, and therefore choose to liquidate the firm. Control rents
are then defined as the difference between the profits of a project and the payments to the debtor.
Because short-term debt was seen by Diamond as being debt that matures before the profits of an
investment are received, it is necessary to refinance short-term debt. The possibility of refinancing
depends on the willingness of the creditors, which, in turn, depends on the new credit worthiness of
the debtor. If refinancing is impossible, assets have to be sold to meet obligations. In this way, part of
the control rents are lost. Of course, this has a negative influence on profitability. For firms with a high
credit worthiness, the liquidity risk is not relevant. A decrease of their credit worthiness does not lead
to a ‘crunch’ of credit to the firm. For this reason, firms with a high credit rating are expected to
borrow on the short term. For firms with a medium credit rating, the liquidity risk can be of
importance. If their credit worthiness decreases, creditors could refuse to extend the loan. They might
7take control of the firm and, perhaps, liquidate it. Firms that are afraid that this might happen borrow
on the long term. Firms with a low credit rating also like to borrow on the long term. However,
creditors do not want to lend their money on a long-term basis to borrowers of this kind. Firms with a
low credit rating are therefore forced to borrow on the short term.
Hypothesis 3: A non monotomous relation exists between credit worthiness and debt
maturity. Firms with low and high credit worthiness borrow on the short term, whereas firm
with medium credit worthiness borrow on the long term.
According to Smith and Warner (1979), there is a greater chance of conflicts between
shareholders and debtors in smaller firms. Examples are the under-investment problem and the asset-
substitution problem, which occurs when managers invest in more risky assets than that which was
originally agreed upon (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1980). In a small firm, the manager usually holds
a large proportion of the equity. Actions that benefit the shareholders will therefore also benefit the
manager. Because the manager controls the actions of the firm, managers of small firms could be more
likely to take risks than managers in large firms. Because these problems can be reduced by issuing
short-term debt, a positive relation between firm size and debt maturity is proposed (we admit that
firm size is perhaps not the most convenient measure for manager ownership, but we lack better
indications on manager ownership) :
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between size and debt maturity.
In most cases, the issuing costs of a public debt issue are fixed, and these costs are therefore
independent of the magnitude of the debt. This enables economies of scale. For this reason, larger
firms are especially likely to issue public debt. Because public debt has a longer maturity than private
debt, a positive relation between the size of a firm and the maturity of debt is proposed. However, this
reasoning does not apply to small unlisted firms, because these firms make very little use of public
debt.
The present study also includes leverage and industry affiliation as determinants of debt
maturity. Myers (1977) argued that the under-investment problem could also be solved by reducing
leverage. It can also be expected that capital structure is, to some extent, sector-dependent.
8The debt maturity choice for small firms in a creditor-oriented environment
As noted above, the present study specifically addresses small firms in a creditor-oriented
system. The relationship between this sample and the hypotheses (proposed above) is now
considered.
Hypothesis 1: Firms try to match the maturity of assets with that of liabilities.
Small firms are more common in the wholesale, retail, and service sectors, whereas large firms
are more common in manufacturing. Because manufacturing involves more fixed investments, the
maturity of assets in these (larger) firms is likely to be quite different from that of non-manufacturing
(smaller) firms. However, the motive for matching maturity of assets and liabilities continues to be
relevant for small firms.
Hypothesis 2: Firms with high growth opportunities borrow on the short term.
Petit and Singer (1985) argued that debt-related agency problems (such as the under-
investment problem) appear to be potentially more serious in smaller firms. This is supported by the
fact that smaller firms face more significant problems of asymmetric information—because most small
firms do not supply audited financial statements. In addition, smaller firms have more flexibility, which
exacerbates problems such as the asset-substitution problem. This suggests shorter debt maturities for
small firms. Among others, Berlin and Loeys (1988) have argued that banks are better in monitoring
firms than are other lenders. If bank lending does mitigate agency problems, then there could be less
need to shorten debt maturity.
Hypothesis 3: A non monotomous relation exists between credit worthiness and debt
maturity. Firms with low and high credit worthiness borrow on the short term, whereas firm
with medium credit worthiness borrow on the long term.
9An important concept in the theory of Diamond (1991), who proposed the above hypothesis,
is that of liquidity risk. To avoid liquidation, firms with a medium creditworthiness will contract long-
term debt. However, it can be argued that banks are more willing to renegotiate on contracts than are
non-bank lenders (Hoshi, Kashyap, Scharfstein, 1990). If so, liquidity risk decreases for bank
borrowers. This induces bank borrowers who have a medium credit worthiness to borrow on a
shorter term than non-bank borrowers, for whom liquidity risk is still an important concern.
Hypothesis 4: Size has a positive effect on debt maturity
Because agency problems are worse in small, owner-managed firms, and because shortening
debt maturity is a solution for such agency problems, the present paper argues that a positive relation
is to be expected between size and debt maturity. However, because the present sample consists
entirely of small firms, it is possible that most of these firms are owned by their managers. In this case,
the expected relation will not be observed.
SAMPLE
The data used to construct the sample for the present study were gathered from the Belfirst
DVD of Bureau Van Dijk. This DVD is the repository of the annual accounts of the firms that deposit
their accounts with the central reserve bank of Belgium. In Belgium, firms with limited liability
(irrespective of their size), have a legal duty to deposit their annual accounts in a prescribed format. A
distinction is made between firms that have to prepare their annual accounts in a complete format and
firms that are allowed to prepare their annual accounts in an abbreviated format. A firm has to use the
complete format if it has more than 100 employees or if it satisfies at least two of the following criteria:
number of employees (yearly average) of at least 50, turnover (value-added tax excluded) of at least
200 million Belgium Francs (BEF) (4,957,880 Euro (EUR)) and total assets of at least 100 million
BEF (=2,478,940 EUR).
The firms in our population had to satisfy the following conditions: (i) be required to deposit
an abbreviated account; (ii) have submitted an account in every year from 1996 until 2000; (iii) have
at least one employee (because the existence of firms without employees is merely driven by fiscal
motivations); and (iv) not belong to the financial sector or governmental sector. Financial firms were
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excluded because, due to capital requirements, decisions concerning capital and maturity structure
could be affected by other factors. Governmental firms were also excluded because, as Smith (1986)
has argued, managers in governmental firms have less discretion concerning investments than do
managers in non-governmental, and thus, less regulated firms.
From this population, we drew a random sample of 1,200 firms. Observations with missing
values were discarded.  Outliers were filtered in the following way: (i) the percentage of long-term
debt and the percentage of fixed assets could not exceed 100%; and (ii) the short-term default
indicator could not exceed 1. The proxies for growth opportunities were filtered by removing the
upper and lower 0.5% percentile. Thus, a sample of 4,506 firm-year observations from 1,091 firms
for the period from 1996 to 2000 was obtained.
VARIABLES
Variable definition
Guedes and Opler (1996) noted that there are two empirical approaches to investigating the
determinants of debt maturity. The first is to investigate the maturity of individual debt issues.
However, this approach was problematic with the sample of small firms utilised in the present study
because none of the firms made use of public debt issues, and because databases of issues of bank
debt were not accessible. The second approach involves the use of cumulative data from the annual
account, and this was the approach followed here.
Debt maturity was measured in terms of the percentage of total debt outstanding. Amounts
payable in more than one year were added to the current portion of amounts payable after one year,
and this was divided by the total debt outstanding, with the result being expressed as a percentage. It
was therefore calculated as follows:
debtTotal
yearoneafterpayableamountsofportionCurrentyearonethanmoreinpayableAmounts
Ltdebt
+
=%
Debt that matured within one year but that had an original maturity of more than one year was
also included in the measure of long-term debt (because this was issued with a long-term intention).
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An alternative dependent variable was also specified in which only financial debt was considered.
However, results were very similar using this alternative specification.
The maturity of assets was measured by the percentage of total assets that was fixed.
i
i
i assetstotal
assetsfixed
inmaturityasset =%)(
It is very difficult to measure growth opportunities for a sample of non-listed firms. Previous
studies using data from listed firms have focused on Tobin’s Q as a proxy for growth opportunities.
This measure could not be used here because the firms in the present sample were not quoted.
Growth opportunities therefore had to be proxied in other ways.
As a first variable, following Scherr and Hulburt (2001), the present study used past growth in
total assets. Growth opportunities in a given year were thus calculated as the geometric average of the
yearly growth in total assets over the three preceding years. In this approach, it is assumed that firms
that grew faster in the past also have greater opportunities for future growth.
Secondly, the ratio of capital expenditures to asset book value was used. Kallapur and
Trombley (1999) concluded that, for non-listed firms, this measure best captures ex post realised
growth. Growth opportunities in a given year were proxied as the ratio of capital expenditures on
asset book value in the same year.
3
4
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Credit worthiness of a firm is often proxied by ratings offered by agencies such as Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s. However, none of the firms in the present sample had such a rating. This
study therefore used a short-term default risk indicator, based on the OJD score, which is a
multivariate logit score for failure prediction. This score was developed for Belgian firms as an
alternative to the linear Altman’s Z score (Ooghe, Joos and de Bourdeaudhuij, 1995). Scores for the
short-term default indicator are between 0 (financially healthy firm), and 1 (financially distressed firm).
ii scoreOJDtermshortstdefault -= 1
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The non monotomous relation between debt maturity and credit worthiness was tested in two
ways. First, both STDEFAULT and the square of the STDEFAULT were included as variables. If
the relationship between default risk and debt maturity is parabolic, as Diamond (1991) proposed, the
coefficient of the default risk should be positive and the coefficient of the square should be negative.
In the second approach, dummies were used to classify the firms into three categories
according to their default risk. Firms with a low default risk (high credit worthiness) were taken to be
those situated below the 33rd percentile (dumsthi), firms with a medium default risk (and medium
credit worthiness) were taken to be those between the 33rd and 66th percentile (dumstme). The
upper 33% of the firms were viewed as firms with a high default risk (dumstlo). To avoid the dummy
trap, only two of the three dummies could be included in the regression. The sign expected for the
different dummies thus depends on the dummies that were entered in the regression.
1672.01
1672.00425.01
0425.01
>=
<£=
<=
stdefaultifdumstlo
stdefaultifdumstme
stdefaultifdumsthi
Although size can be measured in several ways, the present study used the natural logarithm
of total assets and the natural logarithm of added value.
Table 1 presents an overview of the hypotheses, the variables, and the hypothesised signs.
Insert Table 1 about here
Descriptives
Table 2 depicts descriptive statistics of the variables. On average, 47.7 % of the debt issued
was long-term debt, with the median being 46.0%. The average proportion of fixed assets to total
assets, at 46.1%, was close to the proportion of long-term debt. Standard deviation of the percentage
long-term debt was also remarkably close to the standard deviation of the percentage of fixed assets,
with the values being 26.2% and 27.2% respectively. This was the first indication that the maturity-
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matching principle is apposite. Past growth, which was this study’s measure of growth opportunities,
was fairly high, with the mean being 6%. This figure was twice the median, which amounts to 3%. This
indicated the influence of some high-growth firms (which could also be deduced from the maximum,
which amounts to 99%). The same picture emerged when capital expenditures were used as a proxy
for growth opportunities. On average, new investments in fixed assets accounted for 7% of total
assets. The median firm spent an amount equivalent to 3% of total assets.
The average size of the firms in the present sample, measured by total assets, was 756,340
EUR. A very large variance was observed, with the minimum being 13,000 EUR and the maximum
being 32,849,000 EUR. This led to a median that was very different from the average observation of
387.000 EUR. The same conclusion was drawn when examining added value. Firms in the present
sample were somewhat smaller than those in the sample of Scherr and Hulburt (2001). They used
four subsamples, in which the mean of total assets ranged from $1 million to $2 million.
The average leverage ratio was 68.7%, and the median was 72.3%. This leverage ratio was
substantially higher than in most other empirical studies. This is due to the fact that the present sample
was drawn from a banking-oriented environment in which debt is used more frequently. In addition,
the measure of leverage used in the present study not only includes financial debt, but also other
categories of debt (such as trade debt).
Insert Table 2 about here
ESTIMATION MODEL
Because the present data included observations of firms over five years, panel data analysis
techniques could be used. Baltagi (1995) has argued that panel data have several benefits. The
greatest advantage of panel data to the present study is that they allow control for individual
heterogeneity. Panel data suggest that firms are heterogeneous. Because time series and cross-section
studies do not control for this heterogeneity, the estimation results could be biased. Panel data analysis
allows a consideration of a firm-specific time-invariant effect. The analysis can be run by either a
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fixed-effects model or a random-effects model. The fixed-effects model can, in general terms, be
described by the following equation:
ititiit Bxy ea ++=
'
in which a i represents an unknown firm-specific constant, which is referred to as a ‘fixed
effect’.
The alternative, the random-effects model, is described as follows:
ititit Bxy ea ++=
'
To determine which of these regressions should be run, the Hausman test can be used. This
test examines whether the difference between the estimators generated by random-effects regression
and the estimators generated by fixed-effects regression approximates zero. In other words: H0 =
random effects and HA = fixed effects. (In the present analysis H0 was rejected (p < 0.0001), which
means that the fixed-effects model was to be preferred.)
As a check for robustness, run pooled OLS-regressions were also run, as were cross-
sectional OLS-regressions (in which the observations were the time-series means of the different
firms).
RESULTS
Correlations
Table 3 shows the correlations among the various variables. These results again demonstrate
preliminary evidence of the significance of the matching principle—in that the correlation between the
maturity of assets and the percentage of long-term debt equalled 62 % (which was statistically
significant at the 1% level). The correlation between the credit worthiness of the firm and the
percentage of long-term debt was very slightly positive (but this was not significant). The variables
measuring growth opportunities of a firm correlated negatively with the percentage of long-term debt,
which is in line with the findings of Myers (1977). Asset growth was significant at the 5% level,
whereas capital expenditures were not significant. There was a very low (and insignificant) positive
correlation between total assets and long-term debt, whereas the correlation between added value
and long-term debt was strongly negative, and very significant. Because both these measures attempt
to capture the size of a firm, no clear picture emerged from this analysis.
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Insert Table 3 about here
Regression results
Fixed-effects regression results
Table 4 depicts the results of the fixed-effects regressions. Hypothesis 1 (which proposed that
firms seek to match the maturities of assets and liabilities) was strongly confirmed. In every regression,
the MATACT coefficient was significant at the 1% level. Maturity matching was undoubtedly the
most important factor in choosing between short-term and long-term debt.
Insert Table 4 about here
Myers’ hypothesis—that firms with significant growth opportunities borrow on the short
term—was not confirmed. The coefficients of past growth in assets (regression (1)) and capital
expenditures (regression (2)) were not significant. Growth options, and the associated under-
investment problem, do not seem to have influenced decisions concerning corporate debt maturity.
However, caution is required before rejecting the under-investment hypothesis. It is doubtful whether
past growth is a good measure of future growth options.
The coefficient of STDEFAULT (the measure of credit worthiness in this study) was
significantly negative, whereas the square of this variable had a significant positive coefficient. This was
not in accordance with Hypothesis 3, which predicted a non monotomous, U-shaped relation
between debt maturity and credit worthiness—whereby good and bad firms borrow on the short
term, whereas firms of medium quality borrow on the long term. Figure 1 graphically shows the
empirical relationship.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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The relation was U-shaped. However, the lowest value on the parabolic curve is situated at
minus the coefficient of the variable divided by two times the square of this coefficient. In all the
regressions, this figure was higher than 60%. Because most of the observations were below this level
(with the 95% percentile being situated at a stdefault value of 0.55), it can be concluded that the debt
maturity was a constantly increasing function of credit worthiness. This was confirmed by the
coefficients of the dummy variables used to classify the firms according to their credit rating
(regression (4)). The firms belonging to the category with the highest credit score clearly borrowed on
a longer term. The firms with a low credit score borrowed more on the short term. Either way, there
was no evidence for the non monotomous relation between credit score and debt maturity, as
proposed by Diamond (1991).
The final hypothesis proposed a positive relation between size and debt-maturity structure.
The results contradicted this proposition (but confirmed the results of Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for
American small firms). The first proxy, the natural logarithm of total assets, yielded a negative
coefficient which was highly significant at the 1% level (regressions (1) and (2)). Using the alternative
variable, the natural logarithm of value added, the coefficient was insignificant (regression (4)).
Leverage, as a control variable, yielded a statistically significant positive coefficient, and was
therefore shown to exert a positive influence on debt maturity. Higher indebted firms might have
borrowed on the longer term to ensure that they had earned enough money to be able to repay the
creditors. Because the industry to which a firm belongs is time-invariant, these dummies could not be
used as a control variable in a fixed-effects regression.
Robustness
To check whether the results were dependent on the regression methodology used, the results
of the pooled regressions (Table 5) and the cross-sectional regression (Table 6) were analysed.
Again, the maturity matching principle was supported strongly. The coefficients were positive and
significant. There is no doubt that maturity matching was very important. Consistent with the results of
the fixed-effects regression, growth opportunities do not seem to have played a role in determining the
debt-maturity structure. When growth opportunities were measured as past growth in total assets, the
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coefficients had the expected negative sign, but they never reached a significant level. When capital
expenditures were used, coefficients were also negative and sometimes reached the 10% significance
level. However, this evidence was too weak to conclude that growth options determined the
corporate debt-maturity structure.
The relationship between credit worthiness and debt maturity also appeared to be very robust
in the applied methodology. For each approach, a positive relationship was deduced—that is,
financially healthy firms were able to borrow on the longer term, whereas firms with a weak financial
condition were forced to borrow on the short term. Diamond’s (1991) U-shaped relation was never
supported in the present analyses.
The final hypothesis proposed that size has a positive influence on debt maturity. On the basis
of the alternative regression used here, support was again found for a negative relation—in that the
coefficients were negative and statistically significant for both total assets and added value.
A closer analysis of the industry dummies revealed that wholesale and catering firms appeared
to have borrowed on the shorter term. This result was obtained in both the pooled and the cross-
sectional regression. Because wholesale and catering firms do not produce goods, they can be
expected to own relatively few fixed assets. Assuming that they matched the maturity of their assets
and liabilities, this could explain their shorter debt maturity.
Insert Table 5 & 6 about here
Comparison with earlier work
Although comparison with earlier empirical studies is difficult (due to the different
environments and samples involved), it is nevertheless worthwhile to consider similarities and
dissimilarities with earlier empirical work. An important observation is that, no matter what kind of
firm, or which environment, maturity matching is very important. All studies of which the present
authors are aware have found strong evidence for maturity matching.
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In contrast, the evidence with respect to growth opportunities is mixed, and seems to vary
with the size of the firms that are studied. Consistent with Scherr and Hulburt (2001), the present
study found no evidence in support of the growth opportunities hypothesis for small firms. This could
be interpreted as evidence that banks are good monitors, so that agency problems do not have to be
solved by reducing debt maturity. This is a very plausible explanation in the context of our Belgian
system.  Most small firms tend to take loan agreement with a local office of their bank. So, these small
firms are very like to be closely monitored by these local offices.
Empirical evidence on large firms has been more supportive of the growth opportunities
hypothesis. Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Ozkan (2000) all found a
negative relation between growth opportunities and debt maturity. Stohs and Mauer (1996) also
reported this relation. However, after controlling for leverage, the growth opportunities coefficient was
not significant in the present study.
Most studies have indicated that credit worthiness influences debt maturity. Barclay and Smith
(1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) both supported Diamond’s (1991) hypothesis for large firms,
whereas Guedes and Opler (1996) concluded that large US firms with a high credit worthiness
borrow on the short term, and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) found that small US firms with lower
default risk borrow on the shorter term. This contradicts the present findings, which indicated a
positive relation between credit worthiness and debt maturity. Because of the high risk, banks will not
lend money on the long term to weak debtors. The finding that good firms borrow on the long term is
consistent with that of Graham and Harvey (2001). In their survey of corporate financial policies,
issuing long-term debt to minimise the risk of having to refinance in “bad” times is the second most
important factor affecting a choice between short-term and long-term debt (with maturity matching
being the most important factor).
A positive relation between size and debt maturity was reported by Barclay and Smith (1995)
and by Stohs and Mauer (1996). Guedes and Opler (1996) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) found a
negative relation. The present evidence supports the latter findings. As Scherr and Hulburt (2001)
have argued, this mixed evidence on size could be caused by the fact that size proxies for several
variables (such as agency problems, asymmetric information, etc.).
CONCLUSION
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In this study, four hypotheses concerning the determinants of debt maturity structure were
tested in a sample of small firms in a creditor-oriented environment. The major concern of the firms in
this sample seems to have been matching the maturity of assets and liabilities. The maturity-matching
principle was very strongly supported. Myers’ (1977) hypothesis, suggesting that firms with many
growth opportunities will borrow on the short term as a response to the under-investment problem,
was not supported by the present study. There is a clear relation between the credit worthiness of a
firm and the debt-maturity structure—whereby firms with a better credit score borrowed on the long
term, whereas firms with a poor credit quality were apparently forced to borrow on the short term.
The size of a firm plays a role that is in direct contrast to what might be expected from the theoretical
literature—that larger firms borrow more on the short term. The present findings concerning maturity
matching, growth opportunities, and size are fairly much in line with earlier empirical work. The
relation found here between credit worthiness and debt maturity has not been previously reported.
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TABLE 1
Hypotheses, variables, expected signs
Hypothesis Variable expected
sign
Firms try to match the maturity of assets with that
of liabilities
Maturity assets positive
Firms with high growth opportunities borrow on the
short term
Growth assets negative
Capital
expenditures
negative
The relationship between the credit worthiness of a
firm and the debt maturity is U shaped
stdefault negative
stdefault² positive
Size has a positive effect on debt maturity ln(total assets) positive
 ln(added value) positive
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TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables
The dependent variable, %Long-term debt, is the percentage of total debt that
was issued with a long-term intention—that is, debt that matures in more than
one year plus debt that matures this year but that had an original maturity of more
than one year. Asset maturity is the percentage of total assets that are fixed.
Asset growth is the geometric average of growth in total assets for the three
preceding years (in percentage terms). Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital
expenditures this year divided by total assets of this year (in percentage terms).
Stdefault is one minus the OJD score (between 0 and 1). Leverage is the ratio
between total debt and total assets (in percentage terms).
a  Percentage
b  Thousands of EUR
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Median
%Long term debta 47.7 26.2 0.0 99.8 46.0
Asset maturitya 46.1 27.2 0.0 1.0 43.7
Asset growtha 6.4 22.8 -86.2 99.3 3.8
Capital expendituresa 7.6 21.7 0.0 98.8 3.4
Short term default 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1
Total assetsb 756.3 1364.4 13.0 32849.0 387.0
Added valueb 243.9 336.1 1.0 5138.0 126.0
Leveragea 68.7 21.7 1.2 99.6 72.3
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TABLE 3
Pearson correlation matrix
 Lon
g-
term
debt
Mat
urity
ass
ets
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w t
h
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²
Dum
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s
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de
d
val
ue
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ve
ra
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%Long term
debt
1.00  
Asset maturity 0.62*** 1.00  
Asset growth -0.04** -0.06 1.00  
Capital
expenditures
-0.03 -0.01 0.01 1.00  
Stdefault 0.01 0.34*** -0.09** 0.01 1.00  
Stdefault² 0.01 0.28*** -0.08** 0.01 0.93*** 1.00  
Dumsthi -0.01 -0.27*** 0.06* -0.02 -0.52***-0.30*** 1.00  
Dumstme 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.29***-0.33*** -0.54*** 1.00  
Dumstlo 0.00 0.28 -0.08 0.00 0.83*** 0.66*** -0.40*** -0.55*** 1.00  
Total assets 0.01 0.11** -0.05 0.02 0.10*** 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.10 1.00  
Added value -0.17*** -0.13*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.08** -0.08** 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.42 1.00 
Leverage -0.04 0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.35*** 0.23*** -0.46*** 0.14*** 0.30*** -0.05 -0.08 1.00
The dependent variable %Long-term debt is the percentage of total debt that was
issued with a long-term intention—that is, debt that matures in more than one year
plus debt that matures this year but that had an original maturity of more than one
year. Asset maturity is the percentage of total assets that are fixed. Asset growth is
the geometric average of growth in total assets for the three preceding years (in
percentage terms). Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital expenditures this year
divided by total assets of this year  (in percentage terms).Stdefault is one minus the
OJD score (between 0 and 1), stdefault² is the square of stdefault. Dumsthi is a
dummy variable that equals 1 when  stdefault score is below 0.0425, and 0
otherwise. Dumstme is a dummy variable that equals 1 when stdefault score is
between 0.0425 and 0.1672, and 0 otherwise. Dumstlo is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if stdefault exceeds 0.1672. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and
total assets (in percentage terms).
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level respectively.
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*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
TABLE 4
Results of fixed-effects regressions
Total assets + -0.01
(-2.98)***
-0.01
(-2.94)***
Added value + -0.00
(-0.86)
-0.00
(-0.82)
Leverage 0.10
(3.95)***
0.10
(3.95)***
0.10
(4.13)***
0.08
(3.64)***
Adjusted R² 77.0% 77..4% 77.1% 82.3%
The dependent variable %Long-term debt is the percentage of total debt that was issued with a
long-term intention—that is, debt that matures in more than one year plus debt that matures this
year but that had an original maturity of more than one year. Asset maturity is the percentage of
Independent
variable
Expecte
d sign
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset maturity + 0.60
(25.62)***
0.60
(25.63)***
0.59
(25.48)***
0.58
(23.32)***
Asset growth - -0.00
(-0.43)
-0.00
(0.35)
Capital
expenditures
- 0.00
(0.09)
0.00
(0.16)
Stdefault + -0.30
(-6.87)***
-0.30
(-6.87)***
-0.30
(-6.81)***
Stdefault² - 0.17
(3.10)***
0.18
(3.11)***
0.18
(3.11)***
Dumstme -0.03
(-4.12)***
Dumstlo -0.07
(-7.42)***
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total assets that are fixed. Asset growth is the geometric average of growth in total assets for
the three preceding years (in percentage terms). Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital
expenditures this year divided by total assets of this year (in percentage terms). Ln(Total
assets) equals the natural logarithm of total assets, ln(added value) equals the natural logarithm
of added value. Stdefault is one minus the OJD score (between 0 and 1), stdefault² is the
square of stdefault. Dumsthi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when  stdefault score is below
0.0425, and 0 otherwise. Dumstme is a dummy variable that equals 1 when stdefault score is
between 0.0425 and 0.1672, and 0 otherwise. Dumstlo is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
stdefault exceeds 0.1672. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets.
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level respectively.
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
28
TABLE 5
Results of pooled regressions
Total assets + -0.02
(-4.05)***
-0.02
(-4.08)***
Added value + -0.03
(-6.42)***
-0.03
(-6.12)***
Leverage 0.01
(0.48)
0.01
(0.43)
0.04
(1.17)
0.05
(1.55)
Dumman 0.00
(0.18)
0.01
(0.30)
0.01
(0.81)
0.01
(0.69)
Dumwho -0.04
(-2.39)***
-0.04
(-2.33)***
-0.04
(-2.76)***
-0.04
(-2.70)***
Dumret -0.01
(-0.82)
-0.01
(-0.60)
-0.02
(-1.22)
-0.02
(-1.39)
Dumcat -0.06
(-2.56)***
-0.06
(-2.48)**
-0.05
(-2.12)**
-0.06
(-2.41)***
Adjusted R² 49.0% 49.1% 50.7% 49.9%
The dependent variable %Long-term debt is the percentage of total debt that was issued with a
long-term intention—that is, debt that matures in more than one year plus debt that matures this
year but that had an original maturity of more than one year. Asset maturity is the percentage of
total assets that are fixed. Asset growth is the geometric average of growth in total assets for
the three preceding years (in percentage terms). Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital
Independent variable Expected
sign
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.34
(9.65)***
0.35
(9.72)***
0.38
(12.11)***
0.18
(4.54)***
Asset maturity + 0.70
(31.10)***
0.70
(31.21)***
0.68
(30.35)***
0.68
(30.30)***
Asset growth - -0.05
(-1.17)
-0.05
(-1.08)
Capital expenditures - -0.07
(-1.84)*
-0.07
(-1.90)*
Stdefault + -0.61
(-5.40)***
-0.62
(-5.43)***
-0.64
(-5.77)***
Stdefault² - 0.39
(2.36)***
0.40
(2.40)***
0.41
(2.51)***
Dumsthi 0.20
(9.59)***
Dumstme 0.12
(6.41)***
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expenditures this year divided by total assets of this year (in percentage terms). Ln(Total
assets) equals the natural logarithm of total assets, ln(added value) equals the natural logarithm
of added value. Stdefault is one minus the OJD score (between 0 and 1), stdefault² is the
square of stdefault. Dumsthi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when  stdefault score is below
0.0425, and 0 otherwise. Dumstme is a dummy variable that equals 1 when stdefault score is
between 0.0425 and 0.1672, and 0 otherwise. Dumstlo is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
stdefault exceeds 0.1672. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. Dumman
equals 1 if the firm belongs to the manufacturing industry. Dumwho equals one if the firm
belongs to the wholesale industry. Dumret equals one if the firm belongs to the retail industry.
Dumcat equals one if the firm belongs to the catering industry.
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level respectively.
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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TABLE 6
Results of cross-sectional regressions
Total assets + -0.03
(-4.80)***
-0.02
(-4.80)***
Added value + -0.02
(3.50)***
-0.03
(-10.79)***
Leverage 0.02
(0.66)
0.02
(0.68)
0.045
(1.29)
0.03
(1.98)**
Dumman 0.03
(1.92)**
0.04
(1.93)**
0.03
(1.81)*
0.01
(1.47)
Dumwho -0.04
(-1.99)**
-0.04
(-2.02)**
-0.05
(-2.62)***
-0.05
(-5.04)***
Dumret 0.02
(1.34)
0.02
(1.35)
0.02
(1.11)
-0.02
(-2.04)**
Dumcat 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.05
Independent
variable
Expecte
d sign
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Intercept 0.91
(22.18)***
0.91
(22.24)***
0.84
(23.48)***
0.21
(10.81)***
Asset maturity + 0.45
(17.53)***
0.45
(17.53)***
0.43
(16.63)***
0.65
(55.58)***
Asset growth - 0.02
(0.31)
0.01
(0.03)
Capital
expenditures
- -0.03
(-0.69)
-0.03
(-1.92)*
Stdefault + -1.26
(-9.77)***
-1.27
(-9.84)***
-1.32
(-10.20)***
Stdefault² - 0.95
(5.00)***
0.95
(5.04)***
1.01
(5.32)***
Dumsthi - 0.16
(16.92)***
Dumstme 0.09
(12.11)***
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(0.07) (-0.08) (0.56) (-3.56)***
Adjusted R² 45.21% 44.98% 45.84% 44.74%
The dependent variable %Long-term debt is the percentage of total debt that was issued with a
long-term intention—that is, debt that matures in more than one year plus debt that matures this
year but that had an original maturity of more than one year. Asset maturity is the percentage of
total assets that are fixed. Asset growth is the geometric average of growth in total assets for
the three preceding years (in percentage terms). Capital expenditures is the ratio of capital
expenditures this year divided by total assets of this year (in percentage terms). Ln(Total
assets) equals the natural logarithm of total assets, ln(added value) equals the natural logarithm
of added value. Stdefault is one minus the OJD score (between 0 and 1), stdefault² is the
square of stdefault. Dumsthi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when  stdefault score is below
0.0425, and 0 otherwise. Dumstme is a dummy variable that equals 1 when stdefault score is
between 0.0425 and 0.1672, and 0 otherwise. Dumstlo is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
stdefault exceeds 0.1672. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. Dumman
equals 1 if the firm belongs to the manufacturing industry. Dumwho equals one if the firm
belongs to the wholesale industry. Dumret equals one if the firm belongs to the retail industry.
Dumcat equals one if the firm belongs to the catering industry.
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level respectively.
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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FIGURE 1
Empirical relationship between short-term default and debt maturity
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This figure graphically represents the relation between short-term default and the percentage long-
term debt, based on the coefficients found in the regression analysis.
